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Legal Constructions of Dementia: Discourses of autonomy at the margins of 
capacity 
Dr Rosie Harding, Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Birmingham 
Abstract: This paper explores the ‘right to autonomy’ for people with dementia. The 
provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) sought to allow more decisions to 
be made by those who are situated at the margins of capacity. This paper explores 
conceptual approaches to autonomy to highlight the limitations of contemporary 
regulation and the shortcomings of legal understandings of autonomy. Discourse 
analysis is used to analyse judicial language in a key recent case about where a person 
with dementia should live. It is argued that how the MCA approach has been 
operationalised by the courts does little to facilitate decision making for people with 
dementia. Possibilities for autonomy at the margins of capacity may be closed down 
through the discursive strategies used to determine disputes about the best interests 
of people with dementia. I argue that relational autonomy should be revised to 
include insights from person-centred care in order to empower decision making for 
people with dementia, and that judicial decision-makers should engage with the 
relationality of autonomy at the margins of capacity. 
Keywords: Autonomy, Dementia, Discourse Analysis, Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
Person-centred care. 
Word Count: 9,563 excluding references 
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People with dementia and those who care for them are some of the most vulnerable, disadvantaged 
and powerless people in our society. As such, people with dementia require special attention in both 
law and society to ensure that their voices are heard, their rights are respected, and their interests 
are protected. Yet, as with older people more generally (Duffy et al. 2012) little sustained attention 
has been paid to the unique position of people with dementia in law. Dementia is a generic term 
used to describe a range of terminal, organic, degenerative brain diseases, which have common 
symptoms including declining memory, reasoning and communication abilities and a gradual loss of 
the skills required to carry out activities of daily living. These symptoms are believed to be caused by 
chemical and structural changes in the brain, though biomedical understandings of the causes of 
dementia are still somewhat limited. There is no cure for any form of dementia, and there are but a 
few drug therapies available that slow the rate of cognitive decline (NICE 2007). Research 
commissioned by the Alzheimer’s Society (Knapp et al. 2007) which has been accepted by the 
National Audit Office (NAO) as providing the most accurate figures available (NAO 2007), estimated 
that there were over 700,000 people with dementia in the UK in 2007. Updated figures from the 
Alzheimer’s Society (2012) suggest that total numbers will increase to over 1 million by 2021.  The 
total financial costs of dementia for the state and families in the UK have been estimated at £23 
billion per annum, £8 billion of which can be attributed to the value to the UK of care work done by 
informal and familial carers (Alzheimer’s Society 2012).  
Despite the increasing social and economic impact of dementia, it is also widely recognised 
that contemporary social support and healthcare systems for people with dementia are inadequate. 
As the authors of the Dementia UK report note: “despite areas of good practice, the UK’s current 
health and social care system is characterised by a widespread failure to support people with 
dementia and their families” (Knapp et al. 2007, p. xix). Therefore, dementia poses significant 
challenges for medicine, for society and for law. This paper examines one area where improvements 
in legal understanding of dementia could make a positive difference to the lives of people with 
dementia: by embedding the insights from social psychological approaches to ‘person-centred care’ 
into legal constructions of autonomy for people with dementia at the margins of capacity. 
In this paper, I explore the operation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) for people with 
dementia through a discursive analysis of how different conceptual understandings of autonomy in 
law can make a difference to the lives of people with dementia. I begin with an interrogation of 
conceptual approaches of autonomy, highlighting two contrasting frameworks for understanding the 
capacity to make decisions: ‘individual’ and ‘relational’ autonomy. I critique both of these 
approaches to autonomy, and argue that combining the insights from relational autonomy with a 
person-centred approach would be more helpful when considering decision-making by and for 
people with dementia. I then provide an overview of discourse analysis, before using this analytic 
approach to situate conceptual understandings of autonomy in a judicial consideration of the 
capacity of a person with dementia to make decisions for herself: Dorset County Council v EH [2009] 
EWHC 784. Utilising discourse analysis to interrogate judicial language, I argue that a person-
centred, relational approach would allow a more sensitive balancing of the individual and relational 
contexts that underpin autonomy for people at the margins of capacity. I conclude by suggesting 
that this person-centred approach to relational autonomy can empower people with dementia, and 
better realise the aims of the MCA and the National Dementia Strategy. 
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Making Decisions: Legal subjects, capacity and autonomy 
As Naffine (2005, p.1-2) has argued, ‘law works with an overarching presumption of reason: a 
presumption that we are rational subjects.’ Whilst this is clearly an overstatement, as there are 
undoubtedly aspects of legal subjectivity that do not require capacity (for example in law relating to 
the rights of children who have not yet attained Gillick competence) the rational legal subject is a 
powerful construct. When we are concerned with issues such as decision making and consent, the 
preferred adult legal subject is one that has the capacity to weigh up the advantages and 
disadvantages of a particular course of action, and to use higher-order reasoning to arrive at an 
informed decision. The competent legal subject has the right to refuse healthcare or treatment even 
when it would be in her best interests to follow her doctor’s advice. Equally, a rational legal subject 
has the capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and to choose to do wrong, 
to make an unwise decision, to commit a crime. As such, ‘law is for rational human subjects, for sane 
rational adults, intelligent agents who because of their capacity to reason can assume moral as well 
as legal responsibility for their actions and so enter into moral and legal community with others of a 
similarly rational nature’ (Naffine 2008, p. 23). How to regulate and protect adults who do not 
conform to this ideal of an objective, rational individual therefore poses challenges for law. 
Since 2005, these challenges have been addressed in English law through the MCA, which 
takes as its starting point the presumption that people have the ability to make their own decisions 
and exercise autonomy (Coggon and Miola 2011).  The MCA framework was developed to codify and 
consolidate a succession of health care case law (Donnelly 2009) and to provide an expanded 
approach to determining capacity in English law. The MCA thus applies to all kinds of decision 
making, not solely medical decision making. Under the MCA framework, capacity determinations are 
decision-specific, subjective, and concerned with an individual’s ability to make a particular decision 
at a particular time (s.2(1)).  The MCA Code of Practice  states: ‘The Act’s starting point is to confirm 
in legislation that it should be assumed that an adult (aged 16 or over) has full legal capacity to make 
decisions for themselves (the right to autonomy)’ (DCA 2007, p. 15). As a result, even though the 
text of the MCA does not explicitly use the term ‘autonomy’, the test for capacity in the MCA is a 
codification of previous common law understandings of the operation of the ‘right to autonomy’. 
Few would now deny that we have a ‘right to autonomy’ in the decision making sense. Indeed, such 
a right has been recognised by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as forming part of 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in the cases of Evans v United Kingdom 
(Application no. 6339/05); Pretty v United Kingdom (application no. 2346/02). It is also explicitly 
included in the United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN-CRPD, Article 
3).  
The question of what it substantively means to have and to exercise autonomy has been the 
subject of extensive philosophical attention. Rather than re-tread the vast and varied legal and 
ethical debates surrounding the concept of autonomy (for which, see e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 
2008; Coggon and Miola 2011; Donnelly 2010; Dworkin 1988; MacKenzie and Stoljar 2000; McLean 
2010; O’Neill 2002), my concern here is much more circumspect. Here, I critique the applicability of 
two contrasting approaches to autonomy, ‘individual autonomy’, and ‘relational autonomy,’ to the 
lives and experiences of people with dementia. ‘Individual autonomy’ draws on liberal approaches to 
individual self-government, and has been conceptualised as ‘a second-order capacity of persons to 
reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to 
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accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values’ (Dworkin 1988, p. 
20). Arguably, this constitutes the mainstream philosophical understanding of autonomy as the 
capacity to make an individual decision, free from coercion or compulsion. Relational autonomy 
(Nedelsky 1989) on the other hand, is an alternative approach to autonomy, predominantly 
expounded by feminist scholars (e.g. Fineman 2004; MacKenzie and Stoljar 2000; Richardson 2007), 
which rejects the liberalism of individual autonomy, and requires that attention is paid to the ways 
that individuals exist within relations of social support and community. Importantly, neither version 
of autonomy includes a right to having ones’ wishes carried out, simply the right to make the 
relevant decision. In the next part, I outline the limitations of both of these versions of autonomy for 
people with dementia. 
 
Individual Autonomy 
Individual autonomy, the mainstream liberal version of autonomy, has become firmly embedded in 
English healthcare law (Donnelly 2010). As Priaulx (2007, p.9) has argued, ‘the value of autonomy in 
medical law therefore encapsulates the notion that the right to physical integrity and the ability to 
make voluntary decisions must be respected.’  The precise meaning of autonomy as it is currently 
figured in these contexts is interesting, however, because it is difficult to identify the philosophical 
foundations upon which the popular understanding of individual autonomy in healthcare decision 
making rests. As McLean (2010) argues, the Kantian foundations of autonomy (as a decision made 
on the basis of duties, principles of obligation, and backed up by morality) seem to bear much less 
relation to the modern usage of the term than the Millian approach, which is (simply put) the 
freedom to make an individual choice, even though the Kantian foundation is the preferred 
approach of many bioethicist commentators. Christman and Anderson (2005, p.3) argue that 
irrespective of the nuances of different versions of autonomy: ‘the notion of autonomy still finds its 
core meaning in the idea of being one's own person, directed by considerations, desires, conditions, 
and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally on one, but are part of what can 
somehow be considered one's authentic self’. 
Notwithstanding academic debate about the theoretical foundation of contemporary 
understandings of autonomy in healthcare law, it is clear that the understanding of autonomy in the 
MCA is that of freedom to make one’s own choices, so long as the person understands the choice 
being made (DCA 2007). This seems to accord more with the Millian approach. This is also the 
approach enshrined in the UN-CRPD, which at Article 3(a) sets out the right to ‘respect for inherent 
dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s own choices’ and the ECtHR, who 
have described autonomy as ‘an important principal underlying the interpretation of [Article 8]’ and 
as ‘the ability to conduct one’s life in a manner of one’s own choosing’ (Pretty v UK , paras 61-62). 
Given that legal approaches to autonomy in medical law, mental capacity law and international 
disability rights law cohere, therefore, around having the freedom to make one’s own choices, the 
question then is how this understanding of autonomy can be understood when considering people 
with dementia.  Arguably, Ronald Dworkin’s (1993) ‘integrity view’ of autonomy is the approach to 
individual autonomy which pays most heed to nuances of dementia. For Dworkin, the autonomous 
individual is exemplified by a way of being and behaving that prioritises the self, and includes 
aspects of self-determination, self-preservation and self-awareness:  
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Recognising an individual right of autonomy makes self-creation possible. It allows each 
of us to be responsible for shaping our lives according to our own coherent or 
incoherent – but, in any case, distinctive – personality. It allows us to lead our own lives 
rather than be led along them, so that each of us can be, to the extent a scheme of 
rights can make this possible, what we have made of ourselves. We allow someone to 
choose death over radical amputation or a blood transfusion, if that is his informed 
wish, because we acknowledge his right to a life structured by his own values (p. 224) 
Prior to the MCA, the common law approach to medical decision-making in English law seemed to 
follow this view of autonomy (see Dodds 2000). This was achieved by prioritising the competent 
individual’s right to refuse any medical treatment, whether or not it would be in their ‘best 
interests,’ based on their own value system and appraisal of the relative risks. Few would challenge 
this elucidation of individual autonomy as it applies in a healthcare setting to persons with full 
mental capacity. Indeed, this view of individual autonomy may be positively appealing: many people 
would presumably like to think of themselves as having the capacity to choose their own path in life, 
to make decisions free from constraints and to decide which values they base their life on.   
Dementia, however, poses challenges to this ‘integrity view’ of autonomy, because key 
symptoms of dementia can include loss of the ability to rationalise one’s actions. This may be 
apparent through confusion or the inability to grasp new ideas, or a person with dementia may 
behave in ways that seem odd, or lose the ability to communicate coherently (Alzheimer’s Society 
2011). As such, if the right to autonomy is dependent on this ‘integrity view’ of an individual, then it 
follows that a person with dementia, who may not be able to verbally rationalise their decision to 
refuse medical treatment, would be likely to be denied their ‘right to autonomy’, irrespective of 
whether, on the relevant legal and medical tests that person is determined to have or to lack 
capacity to make that particular decision. This seems in conflict with the stated aims of the MCA. The 
MCA regime highlights the need to support decision-making on a decision-specific basis, with all 
possible avenues for supporting individual decisions to be explored before a person is declared 
incompetent (DCA 2007). In many respects, the MCA approach to decision making entails a rejection 
of the need for a coherent, overall integrity across individual decisions. So, under the MCA, a person 
can retain competence to make decisions about minor, everyday financial expenditure, but not the 
management of their investment portfolio; or to consent to a blood test, but not to major surgery. 
Either way, communication of a decision is key, and where a person with dementia is struggling with 
communication they may be at greater risk of having their decisions ignored. 
 In situations where a person lacks capacity, they may have provided an advance directive 
setting out their views about what they would and would not consent to in that specific instance. 
Dworkin (1986) argued persuasively that advance directives should be respected, by outlining a two-
fold classification of interests: critical interests and experiential interests. He argued that because a 
person with dementia does not have the capacity to elucidate new critical interests, although they 
are likely to retain experiential interests, any advance directive which seems in conflict with their 
demented experiential interests should be respected, even where this would do them harm. Perhaps 
understandably, Dworkin’s approach has been the subject of sustained criticism. One critique 
discussed by Herring (2009a) is that a competent person has no right to speak for their incompetent 
self, because the nature of losing capacity is that one becomes a different person. Another objection 
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is that it is not possible to divide up a person’s interests into ‘critical’ and ‘experiential’ ones, 
because people generally live each day as it comes, rather than living their lives in a way that can be 
seen as a coherent narrative (Dresser 2006).  
These critiques of Dworkin’s approach to advance directives would be similarly applicable if 
we were to drawing a distinction between capacity and incapacity for people with dementia 
depending on their ability to demonstrate a rational worldview. We do not generally require people 
without dementia to demonstrate a religious, political or other entrenched worldview in order to 
respect their decisions. A higher standard is required for refusal of life-saving treatment, as set out in 
Re B (Consent to Treatment: Capacity) [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam), but in day-to-day decision making, 
the rational bases behind decisions are rarely interrogated. It follows, therefore, that a person with 
dementia, who may have communication difficulties, should not be required to demonstrate that 
their decisions are embedded within a coherent narrative. Nor should blanket determinations of 
(in)capacity be used to overrule all decisions by a person with dementia. The MCA is explicit that a 
decision is not invalid simply because it is unwise (s. 1(4)); but it is probable that people with 
dementia are given less scope to make unwise decisions than others, simply because of their 
condition. Whenever a person with dementia retains the cognitive capacity to make a particular 
decision, respecting their right to autonomy requires us to allow them to make that decision. So, for 
example, so long as they are able to understand the information given, a vehement and explicit 
refusal from a person with dementia to undergo a medical procedure must be thought of as no less 
valid than a vehement and explicit refusal from any other person, irrespective of whether they are 
able to justify their decision with reference to a coherent world view. As such, even Dworkin’s 
‘integrity view’ of individual autonomy provides insufficient respect for the autonomy of people with 
dementia. 
Using the individual approach to autonomy to understanding the legal framework regulating 
decision making by people with dementia is problematic for a number of different reasons. Firstly, 
like us all, people with dementia are not, in reality, atomistic individuals: they exist in social relations 
which influence their reasons for making particular decisions. Secondly, people with dementia are 
more likely than most adults to be in specific relations of dependency: they are likely to be reliant on 
others for the provision of care and for support in order to retain their independence and dignity. 
Thirdly, people with dementia are likely to be disempowered, in the sense that their ability to effect 
change on their own lives and environments may be more likely to be overruled or limited by the 
relationships of care and dependency that support them. These limitations of understanding 
autonomy in the individual sense are established critiques of liberal autonomy, and they are not 
unique to people with dementia. Rather, for the last two decades, feminist commentators and 
others have been arguing for a move away from considering autonomy as an individual concept and 
towards recognizing the inherently relational character of autonomy.  
Relational autonomy 
Jennifer Nedelsky (1989) argued that the liberal ideal of autonomy fails to recognise the inherently 
social nature of individuals, and that we should thus re-conceive autonomy as relational. Rather than 
considering adults with capacity as atomistic individuals, we should consider autonomy as created 
by, dependent on, and exercised through relationships with other people. She suggested that we 
must ‘think of autonomy in terms of the forms of human interactions in which it will develop and 
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flourish’ (Nedelsy 1989, p. 21). This view of autonomy, that individual decision making should be 
situated within ‘values based on care, responsibility and interdependence’ (Herring 2009b) has 
become known as ‘relational autonomy.’ Much of the relational autonomy literature has focused on 
arguing on an abstract level for a reconsideration of autonomy to include attention to the 
relationships and interactions surrounding the individual. In the theoretical domain this invariably 
makes sense: as Linda Barclay (2000, p.57) has argued, ‘our ongoing success as an autonomous 
agent is affected by our ability to share our ideas, our aspirations and our beliefs in conversation 
with others.’ Indeed, it is almost self-evident that individual approaches to autonomy fail to respect 
the inevitable relationships that constitute everyday life.  
When attempts have been made to situate relational approaches to autonomy, a significant 
portion of the feminist literature has been concerned with the issue of reproductive autonomy. In 
this domain, relational autonomy has exposed the 'choices within constraints' model that epitomises 
women’s experiences of pregnancy, birth and child-rearing (Priaulx 2007). The relational approach to 
autonomy has provided persuasive arguments that help to interrogate the continuing inequalities 
between women and men in reproductive endeavours. It does this, according to Priaulx (2007), 
through providing a richer account of decision-making than is possible under an individual 
understanding of autonomy: 
What a relational perspective provides is a close attention to context; it highlights 
those moments where the law has lost its moral compass in attempting to 
understand human decision making through a narrow (economic) lens based 
upon values which fail to fit the context – culminating in determinations of 
reasonableness that twist or exclude other ways of seeing, being, trivialising 
other moral frameworks, which guide our actions and choices in life.  A relational 
perspective challenges such narrow approaches to humanity: renders visible the 
broad spectrum of concerns that motivate human decision making; makes 
understandable what law sees as contradiction and can explain those instances 
where individuals are caught between yes/no, black/white and choice/no choice 
(p. 170) 
Priaulx sees a relational view of autonomy as providing a means towards developing a legal solution 
to some of the more intractable dilemmas of wrongful birth cases. It is less obvious, however, how 
this more nuanced, relational, approach can be applied to the social relations that surround people 
with dementia. Looking to the first two problems with individual approaches to autonomy identified 
above (that people with dementia exist in social relations, and that these social relations are likely to 
include relations of dependency) it is far from clear what a relational perspective offers over and 
above an individual account of autonomy. One aspect of relational autonomy that is often 
highlighted is the beneficial nature of relational life, and the importance of supporting people’s 
relationships in order to support their autonomy, but as Herring argues, ‘although beneficial 
relationships are an important part of people’s lives and essential to autonomy, relationship and 
social structures can be oppressive and destructive of autonomy’ (2009b, p. 56-7). So, if a person 
with dementia lives within a relational context where her carers do not allow her to leave her home 
alone for fear of her ‘wandering’, then it is hard to consider relationality beneficial to her autonomy. 
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A key limitation, therefore, of the ‘relational’ view of autonomy is the lack of definitional 
interrogation of what relationality means in the everyday, situated, lives of individuals. Much of the 
feminist literature on relational autonomy, seeks to provide a critique of a ‘masculine’ account of 
autonomy (i.e. the idea that individuals are free from constraints in how they make decisions) (e.g. 
Friedman 2000), but does not actually go far enough in excavating what it means for individual 
decision making to be placed in a relational context. Rather, as Christman (2004) argues, this 
literature too often seems to hold the self to an unrealistically high standard, requiring even greater 
capacity for self- awareness and rationality than most approaches to individual autonomy. Further, if 
relationality is equivalent to plurality, or ‘autonomy’ is not individual because there are a number of 
different things that influence decision making, then this is not substantively different from the 
Kantian version of autonomy. Liberal approaches do not require that people are free from any 
external influences when making decisions, rather that these influences are considered as internal to 
the decision making process, evaluated in that context and that a decision is made having had regard 
to them. If relationality means something else, perhaps that rather than having the ability to come 
to any decision that we want on any given issue, our decision is pre-determined by the social 
relationships or relations of power in which we as individuals are immersed, then it seems to be too 
far removed from any possible common sense understanding of ‘autonomy’. Such a view of 
relational autonomy also seems to be a purely negative approach, both deterministic and 
disempowering, and as such not a view of either autonomy or relationality that would be compatible 
with the current use of the concept in law. Bearing these critiques in mind, the utility of taking a 
relational view of autonomy is to provide explicit recognition of the relational context in which the 
individual (taking account of her social situation) is situated when making decisions that are 
compatible with her approach to life.  
When thinking about relational autonomy from the perspective of the person with 
dementia, the potentially negative effects of considering social relationships come to the fore. If 
autonomy is premised on the ability to share, converse and communicate with others, it inevitably 
follows that a person who has problems with communication would be in danger of losing her right 
to autonomy. Similarly, if interpersonal relationships are foregrounded, then it is possible that a 
person with dementia could find herself oppressed by the social relationships surrounding her. This 
is particularly the case where carers are under considerable strain from caring, or the best approach 
to a problem concerning care for a person with dementia conflicts with the best approach for the 
wellbeing of their carer (see further,  Herring 2008). The MCA is clear that every effort must be made 
to facilitate decision making for those on the margins of capacity (s. 3). This is not to say that we 
should always carry out the decisions of people with dementia. Rather, we must be careful that 
where express views of a person with dementia are overruled it is indeed because they lack capacity 
to make the decision they purport to make, not because they are a person with dementia, nor for 
the sake of convenience.  
A person-centred relational approach to autonomy 
Given the limitations of both traditional individual understandings of and relational approaches to 
autonomy, I would argue that legal understandings of autonomy for people with dementia would do 
well to engage with the social psychological literature (Kitwood 1997) and social care practice (Innes 
and Surr 2001) that seek to promote respect for the continued personhood of people with 
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dementia.  It is important to be clear that people with dementia do not lose capacity immediately 
upon diagnosis of dementia. The early stages of dementia are marked by particular and specific 
losses of certain aspects of cognitive function; not by an immediate loss of ability to process 
information, or to make reasoned and informed choices. Supporting autonomy and decision making 
in the early stages of dementia is mandated by statute (MCA 2005, s.2 (3)(b)) and likely to be 
supported in practice. It is only when the symptoms of dementia progress to the point where they 
present difficulties in communication that capacity determinations become a question. Consider the 
following example: 
When being tested, the person with AD [Alzheimer’s Disease] may fail to answer 
correctly certain simple questions that would have posed no problem in previous 
decades. The person may react with anger, might cry, possibly leave the room or 
insist on not continuing. Such reactions are often termed ‘catastrophic’ and the 
person may be described as being ‘emotionally labile’, both being symptomatic of 
the pathology of AD. Another way to interpret such behaviour would be to 
recognize that the person with AD has correctly judged that: (i) she was unable to 
answer a question that was quite simple; (ii) tremendously negative connotations 
are understood; and (iii) she wants to avoid further exposure to a humiliating 
situation. Reacting with anger or sadness to such a situation is quite appropriate 
and wanting to avoid experiences of this kind is a sign of self-respect. (Sabat 
2005, p. 1031-1032) 
Here, Sabat seeks to show that can be conflicting interpretations of the same event. The first 
interpretation calls into question the competence of the person with dementia, on the basis of her 
failure and her cognitive deficits; the second interpretation situates her behaviour in understandable 
responses of embarrassment, sadness and fear. The first approach coheres around deficit, the 
second around self-preservation and autonomy. Whilst it is perhaps impossible to tell which 
interpretation is most accurate in any given situation, the existence of a right to autonomy should 
mean that in lieu of incontrovertible evidence to the contrary, the most positive interpretation 
should prevail. 
In social care practice, one way that autonomy and self-worth are maintained for people 
with dementia is through care practices which draw on the concept of ‘person-centred care’ 
(Kitwood and Bredin 1992). The theoretical basis of person-centred care is that dementia is more 
than biomedical cognitive decline; rather, a complex interplay of biography, personality, health, 
social relationships and neurological impairment create the lived experience of dementia for the 
person (Kitwood 1997). Kitwood (1997) maintained that ‘personhood’, which he defined as ‘a status 
or standing bestowed upon one human being by “others”, in the context of social relationship and 
social being. It implies recognition, respect and trust’ (p. 8) subsists in people with dementia, right 
through to the severe and final stages of the disease. Similarly, Sabat (2002) has argued that there 
are three forms of self, and that people with dementia can hold onto their singular self, but may 
need the cooperation of caregivers to uphold their publicly presented self. Importantly, given the 
primacy of Kitwood’s ideas around personhood and dementia in the health and social care field 
(Dewing 2008), the development and application of the MCA must be understood in relation to 
these approaches to understanding of the lived experience of dementia. Undoubtedly, this person-
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centred approach has been brought inside the more diffuse health service regulatory framework, as 
‘Putting People First’ was a key rhetorical strategy and policy commitment of the previous 
Government in shaping plans for social care reform (Govt 2007).   
Kitwood’s person-centred approach to dementia care was derived from research about the 
damage that carers could be causing to people with dementia as a result of thoughtless interactions 
with them. Initially Kitwood’s research focused on negative aspects of dementia care, which he 
labelled as ‘Malignant Social Psychology’ (Kitwood 1990). His later work sought to provide concrete 
suggestions for improving the ways that caregivers interact with people with dementia. Rather than 
communicate with people with dementia in ways that were: ‘treacherous, disempowering, 
infantilising, intimidating, labelling, stigmatising, outpacing, invalidating, banishing, objectifying, 
ignoring, imposing, withholding, accusatory, disruptive, mocking, and disparaging’ (Kitwood 1997, p. 
46-7), he argued that person centred care could involve ‘positive person work’, drawing on 
approaches that would  be beneficial to people with dementia. Such ‘positive person work’ involves: 
‘recognition, negotiation, collaboration, play, timalation [direct and pleasurable stimulation of the 
senses], celebration, relaxation, validation, holding, facilitation, creation and giving’ (p. 119-20). 
While approaching health and social care for people with dementia in this way may be considered 
simply aspirational or utopian, Kitwood’s approach has been applied in practice to enhance the well-
being of people with dementia (Innes 2009).  The question therefore arises as to whether the 
regulatory frameworks surrounding dementia care can also engage with this person-centred 
approach to empower and support people with dementia, and whether by embedding a person-
centred understanding into relational autonomy, we can provide an approach to understanding 
decision making at the margins of capacity that recognises the relational context of people with 
dementia, whilst simultaneously avoiding the danger of erasing the person with dementia by 
focusing too heavily on their social relationships. 
In summary, neither the individual or relational approach to autonomy as they have been 
configured in the academic literature to date, are able to deal effectively with the position of people 
with dementia in law, though relational approaches to autonomy do seem to provide a more 
nuanced account of how decision making operates in everyday life. In the next part, I demonstrate 
that combining a ‘person-centred’ understanding of dementia with relational autonomy can provide 
a solution to the problem that people with dementia are likely to be disempowered from making 
their own decisions by the relations of dependency that they are embedded in. By understanding 
autonomy at the margins of capacity in a person-centred yet relational sense the aims of the MCA to 
support independent decision making by people with limited capacity can be more effectively 
realised. 
Legal constructions of dementia through judicial language 
Discourse Analysis 
I turn now to analyse a case which determined where a person with dementia should live. The 
methodological and analytic focus of this part is discourse analysis (DA), which focuses on language 
as performative, following the work of Austin (1962). DA was coherently developed into a social 
science analytic method by Potter and Wetherell (1987), who demonstrated that: language is 
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utilised in a variety of ways for a variety of means; that language is both ‘constructed and 
constructive’; that the same things can be described in multiple ways, and argued that ‘the 
constructive and flexible ways in which language is used should themselves become a central topic 
of study’. At heart, DA assumes that language has an “action orientation,” in that it is used to 
‘perform particular social functions such as justifying, questioning and accusing.’ As an analytic 
approach, DA considers language as constitutive of the social world, and asserts that the ways 
objects are spoken and written about creates the way they are in society. Discourse, in this analytic 
method is ‘a systematic, coherent set of images, metaphors and so on that construct an object in a 
particular way’ (Burr 2002, p. 202).  
Although discourse analysis was developed as a social psychological analytic and 
methodological framework, the insights that it provides can easily be translated to interrogate legal 
texts (Black 2002). In addition to the linguistic focus of the psychological approach to discourse 
analysis, critical discourse analysis (van Dijk 1991) seeks to be explicitly emancipatory (Wilton 2009), 
paying close attention to the ways that power relations, understood in a Foucaultian sense 
(Foucault, 2002) are constructed and operationalized, as well as uncovering possibilities for 
resistance. As Harvie and Manzi (2011) explain, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis examines how competing 
interpretations achieve hegemony and how meanings of language are accepted and applied within 
practical contexts.’  Given the clear utility of discourse analysis for law, it is surprising that this 
methodological approach has not been as comprehensively adopted in socio-legal work as it has 
elsewhere in the social sciences, where it has become part of the mainstream cannon of qualitative 
methodology and analysis.  
As Black (2002, p.182) argued, discourse analysis can uncover the ways that ‘social 
communicative interactions position actors and constitute their identities.’ Whilst Black’s research 
focused on regulatory conversations, it is a short leap to apply the principles of discourse analysis to 
judicial language, as this is an arena in which language is explicitly intended to create an action, both 
in respect of the parties in the instant case and, where applicable, in future cases that would follow a 
precedent. Indeed, analysis of feminist judgments and feminist judging has exposed the 
performative work that judicial language does in constructing the legal subject (Hunter et al 2010). 
In the next section, I explore the ways that judicial discourse constructs and positions people with 
dementia, through analysis of the language used in the Dorset County Council v EH judgment. 
Importantly, is essential to be clear that the analysis that follows is discursive, rather than doctrinal. 
My aim is to expose the problematic constructions of dementia inherent in the language used, 
rather than to interrogate the legal basis for the decision arrived at by the court. 
Autonomy in Judicial Discourse about Dementia 
Judicial considerations of autonomy and decision making have been dominated by questions of 
consent to medical treatment (McLean 2010), and therefore are replete with issues to do with 
medical paternalism (e.g., Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41), rights to bodily integrity (Scott 2000), 
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment (e.g., Re B), or reproductive rights (Jackson 2001; Priaulx 
2007). It is rare for disputes about decision making and dementia to reach the courts. There are 
number of reasons for this, predominantly that courts would not be best placed to make decisions 
about the care requirements of people with dementia, in spite of their inherent jurisdiction to do so. 
Legal consciousness studies and access to justice research have demonstrated that legal disputes 
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also require significant resources, legal advice and representation, as well as a particular type of 
approach to, and understanding of, law (Ewick and Silbey, 1998; Genn 1999; Harding 2011). 
Understandably, therefore, there is a very limited amount of case law concerning non-medical 
decision making for people with dementia.  When cases do arise, they are more likely to be 
concerned with financial transactions (e.g., D v R (the Deputy of S), S [2010] EWHC 2405 (COP); Hill v 
Fellowes Solicitor s LLP [2011] EWHC 61 (QB)), or testamentary capacity and statutory wills (e.g. In re 
M (Statutory Will) [2009] EWHC 2525 (Fam)), rather than social care decisions.   
As such, it is vitally important to give due attention to those occasional cases that do arise. 
The Dorset County Council v EH case has been chosen for analysis because it is one of very few cases 
that explicitly concern decisions made by, and about, a living person with dementia. There are other 
recent and important decisions concerning the living arrangements of people with reduced mental 
capacity (e.g. P and Q v Surrey County Council; sub nom Re MIG and MEG (2011) EWCA Civ 190; 
Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2011] EWCA Civ 1257), but these do not involve people with 
dementia. Dorset concerned the living arrangements of an elderly woman (aged 82) with 
Alzheimer’s dementia who was living alone in her own home. EH was subject to proceedings 
compelling a move into residential care against her express wishes. The applicant was the County 
Council responsible for the provision of social care services to EH. EH was represented by the Official 
Solicitor; her family supported the council and the move into residential care. The case concerned 
deprivation of liberty, and would now be considered under the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards 
(DOLS), inserted into the MCA by the Mental Health Act 2007 (see further A County Council v MB (by 
the Official Solicitor as her Litigation Friend), JB, A residential home [2010] EWHC 2508 (COP); MIG 
and MEG; Cheshire). The questions put before the court sought to resolve a disagreement about 
whether EH should be supported to continue to live at home, or whether it was in her best interests 
to be deprived of her liberty, in locked residential accommodation. The question of moving a person 
with dementia from a familiar to unfamiliar environment is never straightforward as there are risks 
of worsening confusion, deterioration in cognitive function, and depression, which must be balanced 
against the risks of remaining in a familiar environment without appropriate self-care skills. The 
court found in favour of the applicant, and EH was placed in a care home. The outcome of this case 
was unsurprising, and probably correct. Of more interest are the contrasting ways that the concept 
of autonomy was discursively deployed in order to construct the arguments for and against placing 
EH in residential care against her wishes. 
Making decisions about the best interests of people with dementia who retain some 
capacity to express their preferences is a difficult thing to do. It is not straightforwardly possible to 
make decisions about what is in the ‘best interests’ of a person with dementia without also 
considering the people around her who provide her with informal care and support. It is important 
to note that under the relevant legislation, legal responsibility to provide care for vulnerable people 
falls not to family members, but rather to the local authority and social services department who 
have assessed a person as requiring care. As such, where a person requires care, and a local 
authority has assessed that person, if family members can no longer cope, or feel that they can no 
longer provide care, or even simply do not wish to provide physical care themselves, the local 
authority must decide on the best course of action in terms of the provision of the care required. A 
person with dementia cannot force their friends or family to provide physical care for them; neither 
can a local authority compel a family member to provide physical care. If, therefore, those who have 
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been providing informal care to a person with dementia cease to be able to do so, then the 
responsibility for providing or replacing all of that care and support necessarily falls to the relevant 
local authority.  
In a sense, this case positioned EH’s rights to autonomy in conflict with her welfare, and it 
was her welfare that was ascendant in the final judgment (Dunn and Foster 2010). But in many 
respects this is more due to the adversarial nature of a case of this type, than because these two 
concepts (autonomy and welfare) are necessarily in conflict. The complex web of social relations that 
support individual autonomy meant that the most feasible way to support EH to continue to live as 
independently as possible and to reduce the risk of her causing harm to herself (given the inability of 
those who were providing informal care to continue to do so) was, perhaps counter-intuitively, to 
provide care in a residential care setting. This is not to say, however, that the decision in this case 
was wholly unproblematic.  
Discourses of dementia, autonomy and relationality 
I now turn to analysis of the language used in EH to expose some of the problems with both 
individual and relational approaches to autonomy, and to demonstrate how a ‘person-centred’ 
approach to relational autonomy that empowers people with dementia, simultaneously balancing 
their needs and wishes with their relational context and avoids some of the more negative 
constructions of dementia that permeate contemporary discourse. Parker J was careful to attend to 
all of the relevant sections of the MCA in formulating her decision, and a doctrinal analysis of this 
case would not uncover significant problems. Yet, as we go on to see, there are some aspects of the 
judgment which are rather reminiscent of the negative interactions identified by Kitwood (1997). 
Prior to this case arising, EH had consistently expressed a desire to retain her independence, 
and to continue to live in her own home, but she routinely resisted social care interventions and 
support from community carers, was found to be unaware of certain risks to her health and 
wellbeing, and was described as prone to ‘wandering’.  In the judgement, ‘EH’s current 
circumstances’ were described by Parker J as follows: 
EH has lived in her present home for many years. PH [her son] lives permanently in 
Brazil and can do little to help. CR [her daughter], who works and has her own family 
commitments, does what she can, but has found her mother's resistance to help, and 
her increasingly erratic and irritable behaviour, very difficult to cope with. The only 
regular source of family support comes from EP and WP who live locally. They have 
found providing support more and more difficult. Dorset County Council has tried to put 
in resources to help EH over the last 2 years, with limited success (EH paragraphs 12-
13).  
In contrast, in the course of the court proceedings, a consultant in Psychiatry of Old Age, Dr Jeffreys, 
provided written evidence that: 
At the present time it is in EH's best interests to remain at home with close support 
from Dorset CC and her family. I have considered the pros and cons and given weight to 
her previous wishes, the comparative stability of her cognitive impairment and the 
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positive features of her current support arrangements. The likelihood of a significant 
worsening of her quality of life if she moved to a secure residential home is high, and in 
my view currently outweighs the benefits (EH paragraph 76). 
From a discourse analytic perspective, it is interesting to note the contrasts between the judicial 
language describing EH and Dr Jeffrey’s language. These differential discursive positions construct 
EH, an elderly woman living with dementia, in particular ways. The court’s language, which seeks to 
demonstrate the need for EH to be deprived of her liberty, focuses on the negative effects of her 
dementia (e.g. “her increasingly erratic and irritable behaviour”), and the limitations of her relational 
context (e.g. CR finding EH “very difficult to cope with”, or EP and WP being described as being “at 
the end of their tether” [at para 99]). In contrast, the quotations from Dr Jeffreys, as an expert 
witness called on EH’s behalf, seem to focus on the positive aspects of her dementia (“comparative 
stability of her cognitive impairment”) and relational context, and the potential for negative 
outcomes from EH if she were to be moved to a secure residential home (“significant worsening of 
her quality of life”). Clearly, both of these quotations are engaging with EH’s relationality in the 
context of making decisions about and for her, but there is a clear difference between the two. 
Parker J’s approach falls in to the critiques of relational autonomy outlined above, namely that a 
person’s relational context may be disempowering and deleterious of their autonomy. Dr Jeffrey’s 
approach, in contrast, keeps the person with dementia at the centre of his appraisal of relationality 
and has the potential to be more empowering and facilitative of autonomy (if understood in a 
person-centred, relational way).  
Another example of problematic and disempowering discourse within the judgment is the 
following statement: ‘so far as [EH’s] present wishes and feelings are concerned, her present beliefs 
are not based in reality’ (EH: paragraph 101). Statements such as this are reminiscent of Kitwood’s 
concept of malignant social psychology, and particularly the more problematic ways of 
communicating with and about people with dementia. To say that a person’s beliefs are ‘not based 
in reality’, involves stigmatising, invalidating and disparaging that person’s experience. 
Stigmatisation arises through the implicit negativity in this statement; invalidation by assuming that 
the reality for a person with dementia is less authentic because it does not map on to external ideas; 
and disparaging by comparing the reality experienced by  a person with dementia  in a negative light 
to the experiences of others.   This does, however, seem to be a common way of describing people 
with dementia in court proceedings – exactly the same phrase is used in a more recent case as part 
of a quotation from a social worker’s assessment of capacity (Cardiff County Council v Ross, 
unreported, 2 November 2011 at [6]). A different approach to this would be to attempt to utilise a 
person-centred approach and to understand the attempts at communication that the person with 
dementia is engaging in, by utilising Kitwood’s (1997) ‘positive person work’. Person centred care 
practices engage people with dementia by recognising their experiences and differential reality, by 
validating their experience and by negotiating through differential experiences and facilitating 
communication on the terms of the person with dementia (Brooker 2004). The same ideas could be 
conveyed by stating, for example, that “EH expresses her reality in a way which is incongruous with 
an objective appraisal of her situation”. This linguistic formulation would recognise the internal 
validity of EH’s experience, but still highlight that there are issues with her understanding of her life, 
and as such would potentially represent a person-centred approach to this issue. 
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A third example of the power of language in this case concerns the issue of 
walking/wandering. Consider, for example, the following excerpt: 
I accept that EH has always been a keen walker and that she walks long distances now. 
The evidence does not support the view that she always does so because she wants to 
go for a long walk. Often what seems to happen is that she leaves the house for one 
purpose but then forgets where she is going, and sometimes cannot recognise where 
she is, so she continues to wander. There are a number of recorded instances of EH 
being found in distress saying that she is lost (EH at paragraph 89). 
It is, of course, a significant element of the judicial decision-making task to weigh up the evidence 
before the court and present the facts, as they appear to the judge. But the ways that EH’s 
subjective experience is described in the judgment has elements of invalidation and labelling, if not 
active disempowerment or disparagement. Consider the different linguistic connotations of ‘walking’ 
and ‘wandering’: ‘walking’ is usually construed as a beneficial activity, with positive health benefits 
associated with it (Peel et al 2010); ‘wandering’, on the other hand, is understood as a pathological 
activity, a ‘problematic behavioural disorder’ (Klein et al 1999) which causes significant distress to 
informal carers and family members of people with dementia. EH’s walking was also referred to 
earlier in the judgment, in the following terms:  
EH is a physically active person. She has always enjoyed walking. She goes out every 
morning to the paper shop to buy a paper (that seems to be her only routine) but it is 
not clear that she reads it or appreciates its date. Sometimes when she goes out she 
forgets where she is, gets lost, and wanders off (EH para 46). 
And somewhat later: 
I take into account that EH has always been a fiercely independent person, and 
according to her brother EP, she has always manifested a stubborn trait. I am certain 
that she will find disturbance to her routine distressing and that restriction of her liberty 
will have an impact on her, possibly a profound impact. However, much of her physical 
activity, particularly the wandering, is at the moment caused by her illness, as is her 
irritable and sometimes aggressive behaviour (para 112). 
EH’s daily routine of walking to the paper shop, is thus discursively constructed as being a 
pathological behaviour, caused by her dementia, which places her at increased risk of harm, rather 
than a normative and beneficial practice associated with healthy and active ageing. Her practice of 
buying a paper is disparaged by raising questions about whether she reads the paper or “appreciates 
its date”; her routine invalidated and labelled as being caused by her dementia, in spite of it being a 
long standing activity that pre-dates her illness. My argument here is not that the legal process has 
either overstated or invented the risks to EH of ‘wandering’: such risks are real. Rather, it is that the 
problematic aspects of the behaviour are discursively exaggerated, and the beneficial aspects 
downplayed, in order to construct a persuasive judgment. 
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A person-centred approach to the issue of walking and ‘wandering’ for a person with 
dementia would likely focus on ways to preserve the beneficial behaviour whilst safeguarding 
against the possible risks. Possible interventions could include the use of technological aids such as 
property exit sensors, alarms and messages or GPS tracking devices. Advances in mobile technology 
mean that GPS trackers in everyday items such as footwear (e.g. www.gpsshoe.com) are now 
becoming available, and can be used to improve the safety of people with dementia. There are, of 
course, some moral and ethical concerns around surveillance and the invasion of privacy, but non-
invasive solutions such as embedding GPS trackers in everyday items may facilitate greater levels of 
physical activity and independence for longer periods, with consequent quality of life benefits to 
people living with dementia. In contrast, for EH, the proposed solution was that the social worker co-
ordinating the placement for her ‘believes that the home staff would try to positively engage EH and 
take her for walks…there was every likelihood that the applicant could employ a specific worker to 
walk with EH on a regular basis’ (EH paragraph 55). As such, following her placement, EH will only be 
able to walk when the local authority worker is available to walk with her, and as this is an aspect of 
her community care assessment, it will be limited by the cost implications of paying such a worker to 
provide this support, and the level at which this need is assessed (DoH 2010).  
Preserving autonomy for people with dementia 
In the justification for her decision, Parker J held that the risks to EH’s health and welfare 
outweighed any right that she may have had to autonomy. The theoretical approach to autonomy 
which underpins the decision in this case is undoubtedly therefore the liberal, individual, atomistic, 
all-or-nothing approach to autonomy. Indeed, in order to justify her decision in the case, Parker J 
held that EH did not have what she described as ‘true independence or autonomy,’ and that: 
Many of her actions and reactions are not volitional. When she wanders it is because 
she gets lost and distracted, when she does not eat or drink it is because she mistakenly 
believes that she is waiting for her family to come home. Her independence and 
autonomy is causing her emotional and physical distress. It is her "independence and 
autonomy" that puts her at risk (EH paragraph 128). 
The approach to autonomy evident in the MCA, on the other hand, is more akin to a relational 
understanding of autonomy. The legislative framework for making decisions in the best interests of a 
person who lacks capacity includes a requirement to ‘permit and encourage the person to 
participate,’ (MCA s. 4(4)), consider their ‘past and present wishes and feelings’, as well as their 
‘beliefs and values,’ (MCA s. 4(6)) and importantly to also consult carers and others with interests in 
the person’s welfare as to their views (MCA s.4(7)). If the decision in EH had been made with a 
person-centred and relational approach to autonomy in mind, then the justification for the decision 
would, in my view, have been more in keeping with the ethos both of the MCA itself and the 
principles of person-centred care that underpin it. 
Rather than requiring that autonomy is sacrificed in the name of best interests, a person-
centred relational approach to autonomy allows welfare to be considered as interior to a person’s 
autonomy, and draws attention to the complexities of the power relations that an individual 
inhabits. Respecting autonomy in a person centred and relational sense does not require that any 
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decision made by a person with limited capacity is necessarily carried out, particularly if it requires 
significant input from others. Rather, respecting this version of autonomy means that a person’s 
wishes and feelings are not excluded or overridden unnecessarily, even if the outcome is the same. 
In all likelihood, the decision to place EH in residential care was the ‘right’ outcome for EH, the 
applicant council and for EH’s family. Rather, the problem with this case is that the discursive 
approach objectifies the person with dementia. EH is discursively converted from an autonomous 
legal person, worthy of respect, into a person whose actions are entirely dictated by her dementia, 
and for whom respect for independence and autonomy operates as a harm rather than a good. If a 
person-centred, relational approach to autonomy were utilised in the judicial decision making, as it 
is in the text of the MCA, it is possible that the same decision could have been reached, without so 
fully denying the EH’s rights to autonomy, or her capacity to engage in some elements of decision 
making. A person-centred approach may have avoided the complete disempowerment and exclusion 
of EH from the decision making process. 
As I argued above, relational approaches to autonomy are imperfect. Such an approach can 
prioritise the values of discussion, communication and interpersonal relationships over individual 
values. For a person with dementia, relational approaches to autonomy may not mean that there is 
any lesser likelihood of being moved into residential care against their express wishes. But 
embedding insights from person-centred understandings of dementia into relational approaches to 
autonomy could serve to improve the ways that dementia is understood in law, and to provide more 
distinct legal understandings of autonomy at the margins of capacity.  
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have used discourse analysis to interrogate the positioning of people with dementia 
in a judicial text. As the above analysis demonstrates, taking a discursive approach to case law can 
highlight areas where judicial decision making is in conflict with the aims of the regulatory 
framework guiding those decisions. By premising judicial decisions about where people with 
dementia should live on the dangers posed to them by exercising their autonomy, the scope for 
‘living well’ with dementia is eclipsed and the probability of seeing dementia solely as a social 
problem is increased. This is contrary to the aims and intentions of the MCA framework. As David 
Lammy, the minister responsible for introducing the Mental Capacity Bill to the House of Commons, 
stated at the commencement of the second reading debate: ‘The Bill will empower, protect and 
support people who lack mental capacity. We can and should no longer dismiss people by simply 
labelling them incapable’ (Hansard 2004, col 22). The Minister went on to state that ‘the intention is 
to give people with impaired mental capacity the chance to express their individuality, as everyone 
else does’ (col 26). It is debateable whether judicial applications of the MCA allow it to fulfil these 
aims, particularly in relation to those for whom mental capacity is neither unquestionably present 
nor unquestionably absent.  
People with dementia inhabit a position at the intersections of capacity and incapacity, 
autonomy and heteronomy, and mental health and mental capacity legislation. In order to better 
serve people with dementia, judicial considerations of autonomy, capacity and best interests would 
do well to be attentive to the inherent relationality of autonomy. But relational approaches to 
autonomy may also present challenges for people with dementia, and those who care for them. 
Striking the right balance in respecting autonomy, facilitating independent decision-making and 
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maximising capacity for people with dementia is a difficult challenge. There are few things that are 
easily achieved in this complex realm, but a small step could be made if, rather than dismissing the 
insights that can be found in social care literature and practice, judicial decision makers paid more 
heed to the impact of their discursive and rhetorical approach, and the need for person-centred 
practices in order to support people with dementia to retain their (relational) autonomy. 
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